Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and Elemental Fairness by Subrin, Steve
ASHCROFT V. IQBAL: CONTEMPT




Ashcroft v. Iqbal1 is an embarrassment to the American Judicial System in
which a majority of the Supreme Court chose to reject the rule of law. Deciding
appellate cases and writing judicial opinions, especially at the Supreme Court
level, are not easy tasks. Judges can, of course, disagree on their interpretation
of law and on what constitutes a just outcome in hotly contested cases. But
there are widely recognized canons about what lawyers, law professors, law
students, and even other judges legitimately expect from the Supreme Court. I
learned them in my first year of law school.
Justices of the Supreme Court should decide the issues presented to them
in the petition for certiorari, unless they request briefing on different or addi-
tional issues.2 One of the first articles I wrote was on Notice and the Right to be
Heard.3 At least since the Magna Carta, it has been considered unfair not to tell
parties what issues are before a court. Second, cases are to be decided accord-
ing to the law, whether in the Constitution, statutes, rules, or common law. A
justice in the highest court of a sovereign state or nation can appropriately
reinterpret law, but not eliminate legitimate binding law. Third, justices are to
respect other branches of government when another branch, like the elected
Congress, acts within its designated authority. Fourth, judicial opinions should
be clearly reasoned. Fifth, judicial opinions should honestly address the con-
cerns of those who disagree, especially dissenters. Sixth, judicial opinions of
the Supreme Court should give guidance to the lower courts so that judges,
lawyers, and clients know how to act in the future. Seventh, judicial decisions
and the opinions supporting them should not ignore the blatantly unfair impact
of their rulings unless the law forces such a result, which should happen rarely.
* Stephen N. Subrin, Professor, Northeastern University School of Law. Like so much of
my writing, this Essay relies heavily on conversations I have had through the years with my
friend, Steve Burbank. Some of the ideas can be found in our recent article, Stephen B.
Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of
Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399 (2011). Any mistakes, as well as the tone of the
distress, appearing in this Nevada Law Journal Essay are my own.
Thanks to my students Kevin Canty and Meryl Grenadier for their superb editorial and
research assistance.
1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
2 SUP. CT. R. 14(1)(a) (“Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein,
will be considered by the Court.”).
3 Stephen N. Subrin & A. Richard Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be Heard: The Signifi-
cance of Old Friends, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449 (1974).
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The decision handed down by the majority in Ashcroft v. Iqbal flunks
every test by which a judicial decision and supporting opinion can be reasona-
bly measured. In so doing, this case relies heavily on another opinion of the
Supreme Court, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly4, decided two years previously.
That case also flunks most of the criteria for a sound opinion, but many of us
thought—or at least hoped—that in Iqbal the Court would limit or repair some
of the damage it caused by mistakes and ambiguities in Twombly.5 We were
wrong.
To show you how lawlessly the Court acted in Iqbal, I have to share brief
summaries of the underlying facts of Twombly and Iqbal. Justice Souter
authored the majority opinion in Twombly, with Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
dissenting.6 Twombly reinstated the dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of
an antitrust conspiracy complaint brought under the Sherman Antitrust Act
against the regional telecommunication services providers created after the
breakup of AT&T.7 In reversing a panel of the Second Circuit, the Court
“retired” the language in Conley v. Gibson,8 which had been cited thousands of
times with approval by the Supreme Court, Federal Circuit and District Courts,
and state courts since it was decided, “that a complaint should not be dismissed
. . . unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
. . . which would entitle him to relief.”9 The court reinterpreted “notice plead-
ing”—the requirement that plaintiffs give defendants enough information in
their complaints to allow them to prepare their cases, including engaging in
relevant discovery—to now require that plaintiffs provide “[f]actual allegations
[that] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”10
The court also proclaimed that complaints must be “plausible.”11 The court
labeled the plaintiffs’ allegations of conspiracy “conclusory,” and held that
their claims were not plausible because they relied on “parallel conduct and not
on any independent allegation of actual agreement among [them].”12
Some courts and commentators thought that Twombly should and would
be applied only to antitrust cases or other cases in which massive discovery
could be anticipated;13 there were hints in Twombly that the huge expense of
potential discovery in this broad-ranging antitrust class action was the major
reason for its decision.14 Iqbal, a 5–4 decision in which Justice Kennedy
authored the majority opinion (joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito), dispelled the hope for limiting Twombly’s breadth.
4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
5 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Pro-
cedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 110 (2009) (discussing how the Iqbal majority could have clari-
fied the meaning and scope of Twombly).
6 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547, 570.
7 Id. at 548–49.
8 Id. at 562–63.
9 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
11 Id. at 547.
12 Id. at 557, 564.
13 See, e.g., In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litig., 566 F. Supp. 2d 363,
373 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (“Twombly must be read in light of the industry at issue.”).
14 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–60.
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In Iqbal, Justices Souter and Breyer now recognized how far their conservative
colleagues were willing to go in upsetting seventy years of Federal Rule juris-
prudence; they dissented, along with Justices Stevens and Ginsburg.15
Iqbal involved claims brought by a Pakistan citizen whom federal officials
arrested after the September 11th attacks. Iqbal was detained in a Brooklyn
federal detention center on charges of fraud in connection with identification
documents.16 He pleaded guilty, leading to his removal to Pakistan.17 In his
complaint he alleged that his seven-month confinement in highly restrictive
conditions was accompanied by illegal and unconstitutional use of excessive
force, unreasonable and unnecessary strip and body-cavity searches, and refusal
“to let him and other Muslims pray because there would be ‘[n]o prayers for
terrorists.’”18 Iqbal alleged that Robert Mueller, the Director of the F.B.I., and
John Ashcroft, the Attorney General of the United States, adopted and/or
approved the policies and directives pursuant to which he was confined and
abused: policies and directives that purposely discriminated on the basis of
religion and race.19
The district court denied the motion of Mueller and Ashcroft to dismiss
the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to adequately state a
claim for relief, and a panel of the Second Circuit affirmed.20 The five justice
majority in Iqbal reversed the circuit court, eliminating some of the allegations
in the complaint as conclusory (while leaving others intact that seem equally
conclusory—more on that later). The Court, relying on “judicial experience and
common sense,” found the complaint implausible.21 The Court disregarded the
allegations of knowledge of the defendants and of their intentional discrimina-
tion, refusing to follow Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s unambiguous rule that “[m]alice,
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged
generally.”22 The Federal Rules are trans-substantive: the same rules apply to
all types and sizes of cases. The Court therefore made clear that its new test for
what is required in a complaint, first enunciated in Twombly, cannot be con-
fined to antitrust cases or cases involving national security or the qualified
immunity of government officials.23 The new test will apply to all cases.24
Federal complaints must now be dismissed in the federal district courts if
the trial judge finds some allegations conclusory and then decides on the basis
of what is left that the claim is “implausible.” And upon what is the district
court judge to base the conclusion of implausibility? His or her own “judicial
experience and common sense.”25
So why do I think the majority in Iqbal should be ashamed of their law-
lessness in what I consider to be among the worst opinions I have ever read? I
15 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009).
16 Id. at 1943.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1944 (citation omitted).
19 Id. (citation omitted).
20 Id. at 1942.
21 Id. at 1950–52.
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 9.
23 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1941.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1950.
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will demonstrate why it is a terrible decision because of the procedure it
embraces, but first I will examine its unsupportable overruling of long standing
substantive law. It is known law, which both sides in Iqbal acknowledge, that
public officials cannot be held responsible for the acts of their subordinates
based on a theory of respondeat superior.26 In order for the supervisor to be
held liable for constitutional violations, he or she had to have personally acted
illegally. The dissenters in Iqbal cited to “quite a spectrum of possible tests for
supervisory liability,” including cites to nine different lower court opinions.27
“In fact, [Ashcroft and Mueller] conceded in their petition for certiorari that
they would be liable if they had ‘actual knowledge’ of discrimination by their
subordinates and exhibited ‘deliberate indifference’ to that discrimination.”28
Nonetheless, although the issue was not presented in the cert petition, nor
briefed or argued by the parties,29 the majority of the Court seems to have
eliminated supervisory liability entirely. As the dissent points out, “By overrid-
ing that concession [made by Ashcroft and Mueller as explained above], the
Court denies Iqbal a fair chance to be heard on the question.”30
I am not an expert on constitutional law and do not have an informed
opinion on what the rule on supervisory liability for constitutional violations
should be. If I had to venture an opinion, though, it seems to me that if a
supervisor knows a subordinate is engaging in unconstitutional behavior, and
permits that behavior to continue, then there ought to be supervisory liability;
this, I would hope, would discourage some unconstitutional behavior. But I do
know that at the foundation of our notion of a just legal system is the idea that
parties should know why they are brought before a court and be given an
opportunity to be heard on the relevant issues. This basic concept was clearly
ignored by the majority in Iqbal. Moreover, they do not even bother to respond
to the dissenters’ objection to this unfair behavior. I have to assume that they
had no legitimate answer.
Regardless of the substantive law change made by Iqbal, it is cited time
and again for its pleading standard and will continue to be so cited.31 Although
I know little about the substantive law of supervisor liability for unconstitu-
tional behavior of subordinates, I do know quite a bit about what the drafters of
26 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (“[W]e conclude that a municipality
cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipal-
ity cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”); Robertson v.
Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515 (1888) (“A public officer or agent is not responsible for the mis-
feasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances or negligences or omissions of duty, of
the subagents or servants or other persons properly employed by or under him, in the dis-
charge of his official duties.”); Dunlop v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 242, 268 (1812)
(“When the issue is taken upon the neglect of the post-master himself, it is not competent to
give in evidence the neglect of his assistant.”).
27 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1958.
28 Id. at 1956 (citation omitted).
29 Id. at 1957.
30 Id.
31 Shepard’s® Query Results Numbering Instances Iqbal Pleading Standards Have Been
Cited and Followed, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/research (Insert
“129 S. Ct. 1937” into “Get a Document” box; then follow “Shepardize®” hyperlink; then
follow the “FOCUS™- Restrict By” hyperlink; apply “Followed” and “HN10, HN11, HN12,
HN13, HN14, HN15”) (Search yielded 6,830 total cites as of June 30, 2011).
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had in mind when they developed the
requirements for a federal complaint as captured by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (“A
pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (2) a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”) and by Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”). I
spent ten years studying the historical background of the Federal Rules and
reading the entirety of the deliberations of the drafters and the articles, books,
and letters of Charles Clark, the Reporter, and major draftsman.32 Clark and
others explained numerous times why the Federal Rules rejected the fact plead-
ing of the nineteenth century Field Codes, why it is impossible to distinguish
meaningfully and rationally between facts, ultimate facts, evidence, and conclu-
sions of law, and why it was a waste of time and unwise to concentrate on
pleadings as a means of winnowing out anything but the most blatantly frivo-
lous of complaints; such siphoning should instead be served by discovery and
summary judgment.33 The forms attached to the Federal Rules continue to per-
mit as valid a complaint that merely states: “On date , at place , defendant name
. . . negligently drove, or caused to be driven, a motor vehicle against the plain-
tiff.”34 If “negligently” isn’t conclusory, I don’t know what is.
The Supreme Court in at least two pleading cases, one as recent as 2002,
instructed the lower courts that more rigorous pleading requirements must
come, if at all, through the legal process for amending the Federal Rules.35 In
1993, the Court was explicit: “Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today,
claims against municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added
specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result which must be obtained
by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpreta-
tion.”36 The Supreme Court was previously acutely aware that it did not have
authority to amend the Rules on its own. In a class action case, for instance, the
Court explained: “[W]e are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it upon
its adoption, and . . . we are not free to alter it except through the process
prescribed by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act.”37
In short, it is preposterous to argue that what the Supreme Court did in
Twombly and Iqbal is anything other than a drastic departure from what the
drafters of the Federal Rules intended and what has been the requirement for
complaints since the Rules became law in 1938. The Supreme Court has acted
lawlessly. It has amended a rule without going through the explicit and detailed
process for amending the Federal Rules that has evolved through the years,
including notification to the public, opportunity for public comment, adoption
by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, adoption by the Standing Commit-
tee, adoption by the Federal Judicial Conference, adoption by the Supreme
Court, and opportunity for Congress to accept (by acquiescence) or reject prior
32 See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
33 See, e.g., id. at 963–65.
34 FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 12.
35 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514–15 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant
Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
36 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
37 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999).
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to the amendment taking effect.38 And, of course, Congress could alter the
Rules on its own for particular cases, as it has done with respect to securities
litigation,39 or for all cases.
Twombly and Iqbal say they are not returning to the fact pleading regime
of the Field Codes: “facts constituting a cause of action.”40 But, of course, they
are. If the plaintiff has to allege what a judge deems non-conclusory facts for
the elements of the case then the plaintiff’s lawyer will have to engage in fact
pleading. And it is even worse than in the nineteenth century; the plaintiff will
also have to survive the trial judge’s subjective view, based on common sense
and experience, of whether the claim is plausible in the sense of whether it can
be proved.
Not only was the Supreme Court lawlessly amending the Rules an affront
to the very notion of the rule of law in Iqbal; even if properly amended the new
rule would be terrible. The dissenters point out in Iqbal that they cannot dis-
cern, among the facts alleged in Iqbal’s complaint, the line between conclusory
allegations to be rejected and non-conclusory facts to be taken as true.41 The
majority finds the allegations of knowledge and intent of the defendants con-
clusory, but they accept as true the allegations that the arrests were “under the
direction of Defendant MUELLER”, that “they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI,” and
that the policy “was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in
discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2011.”42 Why are words like
“under the direction,” “cleared,” and “approved” not conclusory, but “know”
and “intend” are?
I suppose one could argue that “know” and “intend” are states of mind and
therefore more conclusory than, say, “approve” or “clear” because knowledge
and intent reside in the minds of people and are not conduct. But “approve,” for
instance, gives us no facts about how the approval took place. Most impor-
tantly, it is virtually impossible to get into the minds of defendants. This is
precisely why Rule 9(b) states “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other condi-
tions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”43 The majority’s attempt to
38 Legislative changes to the Federal Rules can be made in two ways, pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934: either Congress can pass a bill, or a proposed amendment can be
submitted to the Advisory Committee (appointed by the Supreme Court). The Advisory
Committee may accept or reject a proposal, and will then publish the proposal and invite
comment. The proposal will then go to the standing committee and Judicial Conference for
approval, and then to the Supreme Court for approval and then ultimately to Congress
(although if Congress takes no action within seven months the Rule will take effect pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §2074). STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE
AND CONTEXT 6 (3d ed. 2008).
39 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
40 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also 1851 N.Y. Laws 888–89.
41 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960–61.
42 Id. at 1944 (citations omitted).
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); 5A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1301 (3d ed.) (“The rule recognizes
that any attempt to require specificity in pleading a condition of the human mind would be
unworkable and undesirable. It would be unworkable because of the difficulty inherent in
describing a state of mind with any degree of exactitude and because of the complexity and
prolixity that any attempt to support these averments by setting forth all the evidence on
which they are based would introduce into the pleadings.” (footnote omitted)).
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explain their elimination of the clear language in Rule 9(b) is pathetic. The
majority says that Rule 9 gives an elevated pleading standard for fraud and
mistake, which is true, and then states that the language permitting generality
for states of mind “merely excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent
under an elevated pleading standard.”44 But wait a minute, only a few things in
Rule 9—such as fraud and mistake—were given a more rigorous pleading stan-
dard; everything else was left to the normal Rule 8(a).45 Intent, knowledge, and
malice would be left to 8(a) requirements if nothing else were stated. The
majority’s reading treats the word “generally” in Rule 9 as adding nothing. And
why pick out state of mind issues to tell that they are the terms to be treated like
all other terms? Why not “negligence” or “breach of contract” or “proximate
cause”? The obvious reason for mandating that “state of mind issues” can be
pleaded generally is precisely because they are so hard to make factual allega-
tions about, and because discovery is particularly needed to explore circum-
stantial evidence that might yield inferences as to state of mind. It is telling that
the majority could give no cite to any case that so disregarded the clear mean-
ing of “generally” for state of mind allegations.46 If a student or law associate
eliminated the clear meaning of a rule with such nonsense as provided by the
majority, a teacher or senior lawyer would be severely critical, and rightly so.
What guidance does Iqbal give lower court judges and lawyers for assess-
ing future complaints? We have already seen the subjective nature of trying to
know what an appellate court will consider “conclusory.” But there is another
subjective component beyond that. The trial court is then to assess whether the
remaining allegations, if true, show that the plaintiff’s case is “plausible.” And
how to assess “plausibility?” The majority, drawing on a circuit court opinion,
says that it is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.”47 If by “context-specific” the
Court means that some types of cases will need more specificity in the com-
plaint than others, then the Court has mandated just the type of substance-spe-
cific rules that are impermissible under the concept of trans-substantive
procedure, which the Court has found necessary in interpreting the Enabling
Act.48 Moreover, applying the pleading rules differently for specific types of
issues or cases necessitates the type of political judgments that the Constitution
leaves to elected representatives.
Consider the “common sense” and “judicial experience” test. My common
sense tells me that it is in fact highly likely that the defendants in Twombly
agreed not to compete in other regions and to keep others from competing in
their regions, but I would certainly like discovery to shed light on whether I’m
right. I’m even more certain that Ashcroft and Mueller condoned and agreed to
the discrimination that Iqbal alleges. After all, as Judge Newman for a panel of
the Second Circuit stated in trying to apply Twombly to the facts of Iqbal, there
44 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
45 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
46 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
47 Id. at 1950 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007)).
48 Id. at 1954; Burbank, supra note 5, at 110–11; Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discre-
tion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693,
713–14 n.140 (1988); Subrin, supra note 32, at 956–61.
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is a “likelihood that these senior officials would have concerned themselves
with the formulation and implementation of policies dealing with the confine-
ment of those arrested on federal charges in the New York City area and desig-
nated ‘of high interest’ in the aftermath of 9/11.”49
One doesn’t have to agree with my assessment of what’s conclusory or my
assessment of the trial and circuit courts’ assessment of plausibility in Iqbal.
But I think it is incontestable that these terms—conclusory and plausible—are
highly fluid and non-defining, and that different judges calling on their own
common sense, experience—and yes, their political views—will surely inter-
pret the terms differently in the cases before them.50 These tests force judges to
weigh facts, or even worse, allegations of fact. Iqbal not only ignores the clear
language of Rule 9, and rejects the 70-year understanding of Rules 8(a),
12(b)(6), and the Forms, and rejects the requirements of the Enabling Act for
amending the Rules, such as permitting Congress to examine amendments
before they become law; it is also a direct assault on the Seventh Amendment
that mandates that litigants in civil cases are entitled to a jury to resolve con-
tested factual issues.51
There is another level of lawlessness and disrespect for the legislature
implicit in Iqbal. Since the time of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and more promi-
nently since the New Deal, Congress has entrusted the enforcement of many
laws to private litigation.52 It has tried to encourage vigorous enforcement
through such measures as permitting multiple damages (triple damages in the
case of the Sherman Antitrust Act under which Twombly was brought) and fee
shifting to winning plaintiffs (as in the case of the alleged violation of constitu-
tional rights in Iqbal). Congress, in passing such legislation since 1938 when
the Rules became law, could assume the notice pleading federal rule regime,
followed by broad discovery. As many civil procedure experts have pointed
out, it is discovery that permits the enforcement of much federal law and with-
out which that federal law would largely be a toothless tiger.53 Iqbal eliminates
discovery by permitting dismissal at the pleading stage. And it does so in just
the type of case where discovery is critical, such as trying to explore the states
of mind and secret activities of high ranking public officials. This one case
violates pleading rules, the Enabling Act, the Seventh Amendment, and the
dozens of substantive statutes passed by Congress granting rights to be
enforced through private litigation that relies on discovery. It does all of this
while providing tests—conclusory and plausible—that invite confusion, sub-
jectivity, and unpredictability.
A major reason for the Court’s supporting more rigorous pleading stan-
dards in Iqbal was a concern that the burdens of meritless litigation and discov-
49 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 175–76 (2007). I understand that this is probably no longer
actionable under what seems to be the majority’s elimination of supervisory liability. See
text accompanying footnotes 26–30.
50 See Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 402 (2011).
51 Id. at 404–05.
52 SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN
THE U.S. 3 (2010).
53 See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 50, at 405–06.
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ery would interfere with the fulfillment of public officials’ duties.54 Similarly,
Twombly can be rationally interpreted and supported as an opinion attempting
to protect defendants from the enormous expense and disruption, largely as a
result of discovery, stemming from what might turn out to be meritless anti-
trust suits.55 In each instance, the Court could have tied their enunciation of
more strenuous pleading requirements to the policies behind the Sherman Anti-
trust Act or the common law evolved doctrine of partial immunity for public
officials. Federal common law could have supported this integration of proce-
dure in the legitimate service of substantive law.56 The Court could have
instead, and perhaps more wisely, alerted Congress to the problems in those
areas. This integration of procedure and substance can surely be seen as a legit-
imate political issue, best handled through congressional action after hearings
that permitted testimony on the political, social, and economic implications of
more rigorous pleading standards for sub-sets of civil cases.
There is no evidence that discovery is an unreasonable burden in the vast
majority of cases. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary: discovery works well
(or is not used at all) in most cases, and where used is commensurate to the
stakes involved.57 The Court needlessly applies its new and harsher pleading
standards to all cases, as a result of their reliance on the trans-substantive nature
of the Federal Rules, to the detriment of plaintiffs in all types of cases. This is
particularly unfair to plaintiffs in cases in which the needed evidence is largely
in the minds and files of defendants. The intent element of employment dis-
crimination cases comes to mind.
Ever since the Federal Rules became law, there have been multiple
attempts to amend them in order to achieve fact pleading, all of which have
failed.58 It is fair to assume that defense lawyers initiated the attempts at
reform, as heightened pleading standards negatively impact plaintiffs far more
54 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
55 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007).
56 See Burbank, supra note 5, at 113.
57 See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice
Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 618 (1998) (half of the 5,222 cases
studied involved no discovery at all); Thomas E. Willing et al., An Empirical Study of Dis-
covery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV.
525, 527 (1998) (“[T]he typical case has relatively little discovery, conducted at costs that
are proportionate to the stakes of the litigation, and that discovery generally—but with nota-
ble exceptions—yields information that aids in the just disposition of cases.” (footnotes
omitted)). See generally Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD.
L. REV. 1093 (1996); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L.
REV. 3 (1986).
58 See Letter from Nancy J. Smith, Senior Assistant Att’y. Gen. of N.H., to Peter G.
McCabe, Sec’y to the Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the U.S. (Jun. 17, 2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesandPolicies/
rules/CV%20Suggestions%202002/02-CV-E-Suggestion-Smith.pdf (proposed amendment
advocating that the “‘short and plain statement of the claim’ allege facts sufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie case ” as the standard for employment discrimination action); Civil Rules
Suggestions Docket (Historical), U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rulesand
Policies/rules/2010-CVDocket.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2012) (proposed amendment to
return to more particularized pleading, submitted by Elliot Spector, July 22, 1993); Charles
E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L. J. 177, 188 (1958); Charles E.
Clark, Special Pleading in the “Big Case,” 21 F.R.D. 45 (1957); ADVISORY COMM. ON THE
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frequently than defendants. Having failed in attempts to disadvantage plaintiffs
through legal means, defense lawyers have finally persuaded the Supreme
Court to make the change, disregarding the clear meaning of Federal Rules, the
clear language of Rule 9(b) and the Enabling Act, and the import of the Sev-
enth Amendment right to jury trial. In so doing, they have given broad discre-
tion to federal judges, with no realistic guidance—for none is possible—on
when allegations are to be deemed conclusory and when a case is to be deemed
“plausible.” And they have done this for all cases.
Some proponents of these two decisions have argued that we shouldn’t
worry.59 They point out that many judges have been applying more rigorous
pleading standards to some types of cases all along, and some judges will find
that the new pleading standards have been met—without getting rid of con-
clusory statements and without careful analysis of plausibility—regardless of
Twombly and Iqbal. Empirical data may show that the cases haven’t increased
the number of 12(b)(6) motions or of such motions being granted.60 And this
should give comfort? We should find relief that judges previously ignored such
cases as Leatherman and Swierkiewicz and that they may now ignore the new
rules in Twombly and Iqbal? And what about those meritorious plaintiffs who
are thrown out of court because the new rules are followed or whose lawyers
will not bring the cases because of that fear? Should we applaud triple lawless-
ness: trial judges not following prior Supreme Court holdings, the Supreme
Court making new law in violation of the Enabling Act, and trial judges not
following the new Supreme Court rulings?
The effects of this lawless behavior are clear. Defense counsel is
encouraged to bring 12(b)(6) motions; they have little to lose and a great deal to
win. The new rules will rarely increase the pleading burdens of defendants.
Defendants can bring their 12(b)(6) motions, as in Twombly and Iqbal, without
ever filing a pleading. Plaintiffs, particularly in tort and discrimination cases
where discovery is frequently needed to determine the facts, states of mind and
otherwise, that reside in the defendants’ minds and files, and in the minds and
files of defendant-friendly witnesses, will be left out in the cold. Like so much
of the Supreme Court’s body of decisions since the mid-1980s, this is another
example of decision making that substantially aids defendants at the expense of
particular types of plaintiffs.61 But in this instance, it is not only defendant-
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friendliness: Iqbal is contemptuous of history, rules, statutes, the Constitution,
and principles of fairness to plaintiffs with rights that should be vindicated, but
cannot be without discovery.
